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This article aims to study the extension and immediacy of the perception of intermediates during the observation
of images showing a variation in a spatial property from one extreme (e.g. at the top of a mountain) to the oppo-
site extreme (e.g. at the bottom of a mountain). Three experiments were carried out: rating tasks were used in
studies 1 and 3 and a classiﬁcation task in study 2.
Three main results emerged. The ﬁrst result (concerning extension) is that people consistently recognize
some instances of a dimension as intermediates (neither a… nor b) rather than as one or the other opposite
pole (a, b). The number of these cases ranges from one to most of the experiences in between the two
extremes, depending on the type of opposite considered. The second result (concerning immediacy) is that
recognizing and rating intermediates did not take longer in most cases than recognizing and rating the two
poles. The third result (concerning task inﬂuence) is that there were differences due to the type of task, i.e.
rating and classiﬁcation. The implications of these results are discussed within the framework of theories
grounding cognition in perception.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction: intermediates and the cognitive structure of
opposites
Antonymy is one of the relationships which has been studied most
frequently by linguists due to its great importance in everyday lan-
guage (Cruse, 1986; Lyons, 1977; Murphy, 2003). This importance
has also been acknowledged in recent approaches to the subject in
the ﬁeld of cognitive linguistics: “It is well-known to both lay people
and researchers interested in the meaningful functioning of language
that antonymy (…) as a binary contrast used in order to express op-
position, is a commonplace in all kinds of communicative modalities
and registers: written as well as spoken, fact as well as ﬁction and for-
mal as well as informal. Antonymy is also important in the design of
iconic signs, such as trafﬁc signs, and in visual works of art of different
kinds (Giora, Heruti, Metuki, & Ofer, 2009)…” (Paradis & Willners,
2011). Everyday behavior is regulated by this relationship, more
than one might realize: “Try visiting a public lavatory without
checking which is the ‘gents’ and which is the ‘ladies’. On your way
out, ignore the instructions which tell you whether to ‘push’ or to
‘pull’ the door. And once outside, pay no attention to whether trafﬁc
lights are telling you to ‘stop’ or ‘go’. At best, you will end up
looking very foolish; at worst, you will end up dead” (Jones, 2002,
p. 7). Even speakers innocent of semantic theory have robust intu-
itions about lexical opposites, and children rapidly catch on to the
idea at an early age (Croft & Cruse, 2004). The importance of oppo-
sition in cognition emerges in pre-linguistic phases of human
development (see Casasola, 2008; Casasola, Cohen, & Chiarello,
2003; Quinn, 2005).
This primacy and pervasiveness might be due to the fact that op-
position is a relationship rooted more in perceptual than linguistic
structures and a new investigation of opposites based on this hypoth-
esis has been put forward (Bianchi & Savardi, 2008a, 2012; Bianchi,
Savardi, & Burro, 2011; Bianchi, Savardi, & Kubovy, 2011; Savardi,
2009). There are a number of new questions being asked. For example:
is there evidence, on the level of perceptual judgments, that two
contraries lay on a common underlying dimension (Bianchi, Savardi, &
Burro, 2011)? Is the range of experiences which are perceived as be-
longing to one pole more extensive or topologically different from
the other pole (Bianchi, Savardi, & Kubovy, 2011)? What are the trans-
formations of a given object which are immediately recognized as gen-
erating its opposite (Bianchi & Savardi, 2006; Bracco, Bianchi, Chiorri,
Burro, & Savardi, 2009)? And are there experiences that we perceive
as ‘neither a, nor b’, and, if so, what is their status? This paper
focuses on the last question. It deals with experiences which are
in between two poles but are not perceived as gradations of one or
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the other pole, being rather recognized as neither of them — and
we will refer to these throughout the paper using the term ‘inter-
mediates’.1
Informal observations provide plenty of evidence that humans
perceive some properties as intermediates (neither one pole nor the
opposite) and that this is common to various sense modalities.
When something which is initially very close to you moves further
away, for a certain range of distances it is still perceived as near
(although at varying degrees). This is followed by a range of distances
that are perceived as neither near nor far before the object is
perceived as being far away (and progressively further with various
gradations of distance). Similarly, a tone of the voice can be perceived
as low, high or neither low nor high; a cup of tea as sweet, bitter or
neither sweet nor bitter; a street may be downhill, uphill or neither
downhill nor uphill (i.e. on a level); a pair of shoes are loose-ﬁtting,
tight or neither loose nor tight (and only if they are neither loose
nor tight do we buy them). Linguistically, intermediates are in most
cases expressed by a double negation (e.g. neither small nor large;
neither full nor empty; neither long nor short…) or by terms which
work as cover-alls for very different dimensions (e.g. medium or
normal, applied to size, brightness, weight, intensity of smell and
many more); only rarely are they expressed using speciﬁc terms
(e.g. tepid). But these linguistics aspects are not what we are interest-
ed in here. We aim to deﬁne the range of qualitative variations
leading from an extreme property to its opposite comprising one or
a series of properties which are recognized by an adult observer as
neither one pole nor the other. And this question has to be addressed
in terms of phenomenological psychophysics (Kubovy, 2003; Kubovy
& Gepshtein, 2003).
A taxonomy of intermediates with regard to spatial properties had
already been put forward in a recent work (Bianchi, Savardi, &
Kubovy, 2011). In the present paper we wondered: (a) whether we
can provide support for this taxonomy — and evidence that it is per-
ceptually based — using more traditional methods of experimental
psychology than those used in the original study; (b) whether we
can demonstrate that the recognition of intermediates does not take
longer than the recognition of poles — and we consider this to be
evidence of the fact that they are immediately perceived and not
derived by means of a double exclusion process involving the two
polar components— and (c) whether differences emerge when rating
tasks versus classiﬁcation tasks are used.
Before presenting the procedures and results of the studies carried
out, two other observations are relevant to set the framework of these
studies.
I) Perceiving the middle, perceiving intermediates: Even though a phe-
nomenological psychophysical investigation of intermediates is
only at the early stages, there are, on the other hand, a consider-
able number of psychophysical studies where bisection tasks
have been used to test people's ability to ﬁnd the exact middle
of a line during visual or haptic exploration (Bowers & Heilman,
1980; Brooks, Della Sala, & Logie, 2011; Fink, Marshall, Weiss, &
Zilles, 2001; Gallace, Auvray, & Spence, 2007; Masin, 2008;
Millar & Al-Attar, 2000; Post, O'Malley, Yeh, & Bethel, 2006), of
chromatic scales (Cavézian, Valadao, Hurwitz, Saoud, & Danckert,
2012; Mattingley, Bradshaw, Nettleton, & Bradshaw, 1994), or of
auditory dimensions (Dufour, Touzalin, & Candas, 2007; Ocklenburg,
Hirnstein, Hausmann, & Lewald, 2010; Sosa, Clarke, & McCourt,
2011). What is often emphasized in this literature is that there are
systematic biases in what healthy people perceive as being the exact
middle which does not perfectly correspond to the physical middle
(an extensive meta-analysis is reported in Jewell & McCourt, 2000;
McCourt & Olafson, 1997). However, what these studies also prove
is that the task is easily feasible — people can perform it even with a
single exploration (Lee et al., 2004) — and the ability to bisect does
not only apply to a single sense mode but to various sense modes
(which is why blind people can also do it — see Cattaneo et al.,
2011). In other words, there is extensive and incontrovertible evi-
dence that the perceptual system is tuned to ﬁnd the middle and
any errors generally concern precision. Additional evidence of this
automatic ability in animal cognition has also been found (Mannella
& Baldassarre, 2007; Tommasi & Thinus-Blanc, 2004; Tommasi &
Vallortigara, 2000; Tommasi, Vallortigara, & Zanforlin, 1997). Further-
more, the special status of the center in human perception has been
emphasized in literature which is not strictly psychophysical (for in-
stance Arnheim, 1988).
All this literature is relevant to the present paper since it demonstrates
the sensitivity of the cognitive system when focusing on what is
‘around the middle’ (etymologically, inter-medius). However, while
bisection tasks point to a special case of intermediates since what is
being sought is the single experience (a point, a tone, a pitch, an inten-
sity) perceived as the exact middle between two endpoints, in the
ecological world the perception of intermediacy is not necessarily as-
sociated only with a single experience but may extend also to ranges
of experiences. For instance, it is likely thatwhen one looks at a climb-
er exactly in the middle between the top and the bottom of a moun-
tain, one perceives him or her to be in an intermediate position.
However, there is a wider range of positions that the climber might
occupy where we would still perceive him/her as being neither at
the bottom nor at the top of the mountain.
II) Looking for invariance: Literature on situated cognition (e.g. Clancey,
1997) has emphasized that cognition is affected by context, and
some perceptual studies have shown that perception is also affected,
to a certain degree, by subjective variables. For example with regard
to spatial properties, which are the subject of this paper, slant
perception turned out to be in part affected by mood (e.g. Riener,
Stefanucci, Profﬁtt, & Clore, 2011) or object size by apparent grasping
abilities (e.g. Linkenauger, Witt, & Profﬁtt, 2011). It is obvious to us
that the perception of being at the midpoint of or at the top of a
mountain might change to a certain degree when ascending or de-
scending, or might depend on how tired the climber is. However,
subjective conditions are not the focus of this study —whereas con-
text has been partially taken into consideration by applying the same
dimensions to two different objects (as explained in the method
section of study 1). Our main focus here, as in previous works on
the phenomenological psychophysics of opposites (Bianchi, Savardi,
& Burro, 2011; Bianchi, Savardi, & Kubovy, 2011) is to test invariance.
2. Starting point and research questions
According to the taxonomy identiﬁed by Bianchi, Savardi, and
Kubovy (2011) — which, to avoid repetition, we will refer to in the
following pages as BSK — spatial dimensions are characterized by 4
different phenomenological structures, deﬁned by the topological
and metric characteristics of pole A, intermediates, and pole B.
i) Point–No intermediates–Range (PNR): prototype complete-
incomplete. These dimensions are metrically characterized by
strong asymmetry and a negligible intermediate region. Topo-
logically, the shorter pole is in most cases a single experience,
what in topology is called a point; in some, rarer, cases it is a
restricted bounded range. The longer pole is an unbounded
range; the intermediates are non-existent;
1 Studies on degree modiﬁcations in linguistics (e.g. Kennedy & McNally, 2005;
Paradis, 2000) are not studies on intermediates in the sense intended in this study
(i.e. experiences perceived as neither a, nor b). They demonstrate that properties are
gradable (e.g. quite large; almost at the top). This gradability is in a sense a necessary
condition in order to have something in between the two extremes but this ‘something
in between’ may be recognized as gradations of pole a or gradations of pole b and not
necessarily as neither a nor b, which is instead what we have been speciﬁcally investi-
gating here (i.e. a ‘third component’ of dimensions, when it exists).
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ii) Range–Range–Range (RRR): prototype large-small. These di-
mensions are metrically characterized by moderate asymmetry
and an intermediate region covering around 1/3 of the dimen-
sion. Topologically, the shorter pole is a bounded range and the
longer pole an unbounded range; the intermediates are a
range;
iii) Point–Range–Point (PRP): prototype full-empty. These di-
mensions are metrically characterized by slight asymmetry
and an extensive intermediate region covering around 2/3
of the dimension. Topologically, the poles are usually points
or less frequently bounded ranges; the intermediates are a
range;
iv) Range–Point–Range (RPR): prototype inside-outside. These di-
mensions are metrically characterized by minimal asymmetry
and an almost inexistent intermediate region. Topologically, the
poles are symmetrically either bounded or unbounded ranges;
the intermediate is a point.
These structures emerged in two experiments where adult partic-
ipants (working in inter-observation groups) were asked to focus on
as many real life experiences of spatial properties as they could directly
experience in the surrounding environment in addition to objects/
environments not under observation at that moment in time but
which they had experienced in the past and could inter-subjectively
refer to.
The aim of the three studies presented in this paper was to verify
whether we can support this taxonomy using more traditional
methods of experimental psychology. We paid particular attention
to the structure of intermediates in order to determine ﬁrst, whether
intermediates are a necessary component in the structure of dimen-
sions, i.e. whether some instances of the dimension are recognized
as instances neither of one pole nor of the other; second, whether
the extension of this subset varies in agreement with the above-
mentioned taxonomy and is quite independent of the speciﬁc object
to which the property is applied; third, in addition to the two former
objectives which are common to all three studies, in study 1 we also
aimed to verify whether the response times needed to recognize
and rate intermediates are not in general slower than times needed
to recognize and rate the properties of poles. If intermediates are
directly perceived as easily as extreme polarized properties longer
times should not be required; fourth, we aimed to understandwhether
the task (classiﬁcation task versus rating task) impacts on the deﬁnition
of the structure of dimensions and to determine which of these tasks is
more in agreement with BSK taxonomy.
3. Study 1
The aim of this study was to verify whether the four structures
described in the previous section (PRP, RPR, RRR, PNR) are upheld
in a standard rating task and a standard setting (see procedure). We
paid special attention to the intermediate component, with the aim
of understanding whether there are some instances of a dimension
(and if so how many) that are perceived as neither one pole nor the
opposite pole. We also wished to establish whether the time needed
to perceive and rate the presence of an intermediate property in a
scene (e.g. neither far nor near) was longer than that required to per-
ceive and rate the presence of the two polar properties (e.g. far, near).
If intermediates have the same perceptual status as polar properties, a
longer period of time would not be necessary to perceive and rate
them.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
43 adults (aged 20–43) divided into two groups (21 in group 1, 22
in group 2).
3.1.2. Materials
16 series of 23 color pictures were used. The 23 images showed
the same scene, but each image differed slightly in terms of the prop-
erty in question, varying from an extreme state (e.g. at the top) to the
opposite state (e.g. at the bottom). In between the two extremes there
were constant increments through 21 intermediate stages. An exam-
ple of the 23 images forming the at the top-at the bottom series is
shown in Fig. 1. We decided to show 23 variations since they repre-
sented qualitatively noticeable increments which were, however,
small enough for a sensitive scale according to the idea of ‘phenome-
nological threshold’ (put forward in Bianchi, Savardi, & Kubovy,
2011). The series involved eight different contraries sampled from
the list of 37 basic spatial dimensions described in the same paper. Each
set of contraries was applied to two different objects/situations (Table 1).
The two objects/situations were chosen in a preliminary inter-
observational phase by 4 expert judges according to the criterion
that the property being observed had two different perceptual instan-
tiations in the two conditions (e.g. it applied to continuous versus
discrete objects, to a random versus an ordered pattern, or to one
versus several objects). We opted for this criterion in order to enhance
the generalizability of the results.
3.1.3. Procedure
A stand alone software (programming language: Actionscript 3 for
Adobe AIR runtime environments) was used for the presentation of
stimuli and the collection of response times and ratings. Eight series
(4 Types × 2 Dimensions) of 23 images were presented to each group
of participants. The variables within subject were Types (PRP, RRR, PNR,
RPR), Dimensions (2 for every Type), Images (23 images forming a series,
showing variations of a property from one pole to the opposite pole) and
Components (pole a, intermediates, pole b), whereas the Object/scene
to which each dimension was applied varied between groups (see
Table 1 — each group saw only one object/scene per dimension).
Each series of 23 images was presented three times: on one occasion
the participants were asked to look at the images and rate how much
evidence there was of property a (e.g. at the top); on another occasion
they looked at and rated how much evidence there was of property b
(e.g. at the bottom) and on yet another occasion they observed and
rated the evidence of a property which was neither a nor b (e.g. neither
at the top nor at the bottom). The three repetitions of each series were
never presented one immediately after the other, but at a distance of
at least three series: after rating, for example, how much evidence
there was of the property at the top in the series regarding the object
‘mountain’, participants were presented with three or four series of
images referring to different objects and different pairs of opposites
(e.g. near, neither beginning nor end, complete) and only at this point
were they shown the series of images referring to the ‘mountain’
again, being asked this time to rate one of the other two components
which had not yet been considered (i.e. at the bottom or neither at the
top nor at the bottom). Within each series the 23 images were presented
in random order.
A question appeared at the center of the screen (e.g. “to what ex-
tent, looking at the position of the ﬂag with respect to the mountain,
do you perceive the property at the top?”). Participants were asked to
read the question carefully and, when ready, to press a key on a key-
board to make the ﬁrst image appear (images were full screen).
When ready to respond, participants pressed the space bar; response
times were recorded and a min-max scale appeared. Participants
expressed their rating by moving the cursor along the scale (ratings
were automatically recoded in a numerical scale ranging from 0 to
100 and recorded). The initial question appeared again at the center
of the screen and a new image randomly followed. This occurred for
all 23 images in each series. After a series was ﬁnished, the question
changed and a new series of images was presented.
The instructions were verbally provided at the beginning of the ex-
periment, and the meaning of the term “intermediate” was explained
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(neither a nor b, not both a and b2). The participants were invited to rely
on their own perception. It was also explained that their response time
would be recorded. Since the experiment lasted on average 60 minutes,
participants were invited to take a short break every time the question
changed (i.e. before a new series of images).
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Time needed to recognize and rate the intermediates and the
two poles.
Response Times (RTs) provide an indication of whether recognizing
the presence of intermediates and quantifying them took more time
than recognizing and quantifying the presence of qualities related to
the two poles. If the perception of intermediates is not immediate but
2 Phenomenally speaking, the experience of neither a nor b is not the same as the ex-
perience of both a and b. For instance, a shoe that is neither loose nor tight is not both
loose and tight; tea which is neither sweet nor bitter is not both sweet and bitter. Note
that this holds independently of the fact that in some cases the intermediate state
might in fact really have been obtained by means of a combination of two opposite
properties (like, for example, when one adds cold water to hot water in order to cool
it down or when one adds white color to black color to obtain gray). When we experi-
ence that the water is neither hot nor cold, we do not experience simultaneously a bit
of both poles, but a new state which is neither of them.
Fig. 1. The 23 stimuli used for the pair of contraries at the top–at the bottom referring to the position of a ﬂag on a mountain.
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is secondary to the perception that something is not a and at the same
time is not b, greater response times should be associated with ratings
of intermediates than with ratings of a or b.
A ﬁrst exploration of the data with a conventional linear model
on RTs (ANOVA) was carried out for each dimension. The QQ-plots
showed that the residuals were far from normally distributed (an
example is provided in Fig. 2, diagram on the left). To check what
an appropriate transformation of the raw RTs might be, we looked at
Box-Cox plots (Fig. 2, central diagram), which suggested the log(RTs)
transformation. Conventional linear models were then applied to
log(RTs) and indeed the QQ-plots showed that the residuals were
approximately normally distributed (Fig. 2, diagram on the right).
We therefore performed our ﬁnal analyses on log(RTs), using
linear mixed-effect models (REML criterion estimate). Fig. 3 shows
how log(RTs) on average changed for the three components.
What was particularly interesting was to determine whether the
rating of neither-nor was slower that the ratings of the poles. We test-
ed this with Tukey multiple comparison tests on the results of the
mixed-effect models (see Fig. 4). As conﬁrmed by these tests, the rating
of neither-nor was systematically slower for only 2 of the 8 dimensions
(dense-sparse and beginning-end). For the other dimensions, in some
cases the log(RTs) associated with intermediates were in between the
log(RTs) of the poles, which means that rating intermediates was
slower than rating one pole but faster than rating the other — this
happened for complete-incomplete (cake and car park), in front-behind
(runners), and near-far (football). In other cases ratings of intermedi-
ates were faster than those of both poles — this happened for
above-below (chalet and thermometer), ordered-disordered (arrows
and cards), and top-bottom (ladder and mountain). In the remaining
cases, rating intermediates was slower than rating one pole but
the same speed as rating the other pole — this happened with in
front-behind (monitor) and near-far (theater). In conclusion, for 12 out
of the 16 series analyzed, the time to rate neither-nor was shorter
than the time to rate at least one pole (and in 6 of these 12 series it
was shorter than both poles) conﬁrming our hypothesis that intermedi-
ates are not harder to recognize and rate than polar properties. No
systematic association was found between log(RTs) and types.
3.2.2. Rating data
The ratings for each series of ﬁgures are represented in Fig. 5,
together with the regression line resulting from the application of
Local regression modeling (LOESS). LOESS ﬁts simple models to local-
ized subsets of the data to build up a function that describes the
deterministic part of the variation in the data, point by point.
Some issues emerge from these diagrams. Firstly, for some compo-
nents (i.e. above, neither above nor below and below; beginning, neither
end-nor beginning and end; top and even more clearly bottom) partic-
ipants seemed to fall into two categories and the LOESS smoothing
curves are in these cases a compromise between the two. For all
other pairs there was a clear unique trend of responses. Secondly,
there was a large number of zero ratings indicating a reciprocal exclu-
sion of the properties; in other words when one was present the
others were frequently not perceivable. Thirdly, the whole scale of
ratings is also used for intermediates (as for the poles), which
means that maximum evidence was recognized even when neither-
nor properties were involved. Finally, there appeared to be striking
differences between the ratings of poles and intermediates belonging
to different types of dimensions whereas similar patterns characterize
the curves referring to the same dimension but applied to two different
objects. To test this last aspect we applied 2-sample Permutation Tests
to the set of values forming the regression curves related to object 1
and object 2, for each dimension. As shown in Table 2 no signiﬁcant
differences were found for any of the curves.
What does the shape of the curves suggest regarding the internal
structure of the various types of dimensions analyzed? Let us discuss
this by focusing onwhere the zero ratings apply.With regard to interme-
diate properties (neither-nor): 1) in general, zero ratings of neither-nor
characterize the images at the two extremes of each series (towards
stimuli 1 and 23 respectively) and this conﬁrms that intermediates are
not visible when extremely well polarized properties are shown — in
other words, there are at least two instances of each dimension that are
perceived as opposite polar properties and not as intermediates; 2) zero
ratings of neither-nor apply to a wide range of images for above-below
and in front-behind and this is consistent with the fact that these dimen-
sions, according to BSK taxonomy, have a single intermediate (they be-
long to the RPR type structure); 3) zero ratings of neither-nor were
Fig. 2. Diagram on the left: example of QQ-plots showing the distribution of residuals from the ANOVA conducted on RTs for the pair above–below. Central diagram: Box–Cox plot
showing that a good transformation of the RTs data is log(RTs), since λ ≈ 0. Diagram on the right: example of QQ-plots showing the distribution of residuals from the ANOVA
conducted on log(RTs) for the pair above–below.
Table 1
Spatial opposites (belonging to the four structure types) studied in the three experi-
ments presented in the present paper, each applied to two different objects/situations.
Type of
contrary
Contrary properties
(Dimensions)
Applied to (objects/situations)
PNR Complete–incomplete
Ordered–disordered
A cake, a car parka
A set of arrows, a set of playing cards
PRP Beginning–end
At the top–at the bottom
A path, a dictionary
A mountain, a ladder
RPR In front of–behind
Above–below
Two runners, a computer monitor
A thermometer, a mountain chalet
RRR Near–far
Dense–sparse
A seat in a theater, a ball on a football
pitch
A random set of paper confetti, the
teeth of a comb
a The experiment was done in Italian: the attributes “completo–incompleto” (En-
glish “complete–incomplete”) used to refer to a cake and a car park are perfectly ap-
propriate in Italian.
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associated with the entire series of images for ordered-disordered for the
set of cards as this is in fact a dimension that, according to BSK taxonomy,
is characterized by the absence of intermediates (PNR) and zero ratings
for intermediates throughout thewhole series should have been similarly
found for the other object (arrows) and also for the dimension complete-
incomplete, but this was not the case. This is a discrepancywhich needs to
be thought about and further investigated (see studies 2 and 3).
With regard to pole properties: 1) in general, zero ratings of a
polar property characterized the imageswhichwere at the opposite ex-
treme of the series; for example, zero ratings of near applied to
images representing the region towards the pole far; this conﬁrms, on
a perceptual level, the rule of the mutual exclusion of opposites, i.e.
when one property is visible with maximum salience the opposite
property is not visible; 2) zero ratings of the opposite polar property
characterized several images in the series which, according to SBK
taxonomy, have a single intermediate point splitting the domain in
two halves (i.e. dimension type RPR: above-below and in front-behind).
The distribution of zero ratings that was found conﬁrms that for these
dimensions a polar property, e.g. above, certainly does not apply either
to the images representing the opposite pole or to the central interme-
diate; similar behavior also characterized end-beginning and top-bottom
(PRP according to BSK) where zero ratings cover more than half of the
series — even though the extension of zero ratings is not as extended
as expected given the characterization of these poles in terms of point
properties (this discrepancy also deserves attention — see studies 2
and 3).
Fig. 3. Average log(RTs) associatedwith the three components of each bipolar dimension (dotted lines indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals). Bipolar dimensions are grouped by Structure Type.
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When responses fell into two different groups, this usually hap-
pened because one group of responses followed a linear trend, i.e.
participants judged that the evidence of the property increased con-
stantly throughout the series of images (and this is what one would
expect for graded properties). Conversely, the other group of re-
sponses followed a distribution that is more typical of binary proper-
ties (which are either present or absent).
In summary, for dimensions belonging to the Range–Point–Range
structure (top-left quadrant in Fig. 5) the results were compatible
with the predictions: there was clear evidence that the central stimu-
lus of the series was perceived as an intermediate. Some responses
also indicated the perception of another one or two stimuli as
intermediates, but it is clear that the rest of the stimuli were unambig-
uously perceived as either pole a or pole b. This behavior was consistent
for all of the 4 pairs analyzed.
For the Range–Range–Range structure (bottom-left quadrant of
Fig. 5), the two dimensions analyzed behaved in a way that was gen-
erally compatible with the predictions regarding the poles. An ex-
tended number of stimuli showed the polar property increasing/
decreasing in a linear manner. The normal distribution of the ratings
for neither near-nor far was also in agreement with BSK taxonomy. In
contrast, for dense-sparse, the intermediates were not well character-
ized: they were deﬁnitely not perceived at the two extremes of the
series, but their distribution around the regression line in the central
Fig. 4. Tukey multiple comparisons for the mixed-effect models conducted on each series of images. Each diagram plots the difference between the log(RTs) needed to rate the two
components compared (pole A — neither nor; pole B — neither nor; pole A — pole B). The differences between the two log(RTs) is signiﬁcant (p b 0.01) when the conﬁdence
interval does not include 0).
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stimuli of the series is extremely widespread, indeed almost random.3
The behavior of dimensions belonging to the Point–Range–Point
structure (right-bottom quadrant of Fig. 5) reﬂected in part what
we expected. Many of the images in the series were perceived as in-
termediates. The range was more extended for the dimensions be-
longing to this typology than for any other dimension considered in
the study. What was missing was conﬁrmation of the perception of
the two poles as points. In fact only a subgroup of participants per-
ceived the property in a small number of ﬁgures and declared it to
be absent in all the others; for another subgroup of participants, the
ratings of the polar properties decreased in a linear manner.
In dimensions belonging to the Point–No intermediates–Range
structure (top-right quadrant of Fig. 5), the behavior of only one com-
ponent (incomplete, disordered) was found to vary gradually (almost
in a linear fashion) as in fact had been expected. The behavior of the
other two components was not in agreement with what had been
expected based on BSK taxonomy. As in the two previous structures
where a Point component was involved (RPR and PRP), the point
poles (complete and ordered) turned out to be graded and not singu-
lar. Moreover, despite the fact that these dimensions had been
expected to have no intermediates, participants did not categorically
deny that they perceived intermediacy, but in fact admitted that they
perceived its presence. Only in the case of ordered-disordered (apply-
ing to the set of arrows) did a few participants give ratings of zero in-
termediacy to all the ﬁgures in the series.
3.2.3. What happens to the two poles when intermediates are maximally
evident?
In order to further explore the features of intermediates and the
differences between them associated with the various types of
dimensions, we carried out an additional step in the analyses. We
transformed the data from a continuous to a category scale (with 5
categories: 0–4) and focused only on the stimuli for which the most
frequent category (the mode) of intermediacy was the maximum
value on the new scale (i.e. 4). We wondered what happens to the
ratings of the poles in these cases.
This analysis helped us to see further differences between the vari-
ous types of dimension. It showed in fact that for one type (RPR), max-
imum evidence of intermediacy excluded the perception to any degree
of one or the other pole (see Fig. 6 above-below:when the mode for in-
termediates is 4, the mode for both pole a and pole b is 0). This was not
true for the other types of contrary: for type PRP contraries, the stimuli
with the greatest evidence of intermediacy (intermediate mode = 4)
at the same time showed to a certain degree evidence of one of the
two poles, while the other pole was absent (see Fig. 6 at the top-at the
bottom). For the RRR and PNR types, the stimuli with the greatest evi-
dence of intermediacy were at the same time described as showing to
a certain degree evidence of both pole a and pole b— to an equal degree
in some central stimuli, and to different degrees in other stimuli, more
towards the poles (Fig. 6, near-far and complete-incomplete).
These results suggest a sharp distinction between dimensions
where the three components (pole a, intermediates, pole b) are dis-
junctive sets (RPR), and dimensions where the three components
overlap (PRP, RRR and PNR). This overlap can be between the set of
intermediates and one of the two poles and this is always the case
for PRP (for example, something can be perceived to be simulta-
neously both to a certain degree neither at the top nor at the bottom
and to a certain degree at the top). The overlap may also involve
the set of intermediates and both poles. This applies to dimensions
belonging to the RRR structure (what is perceived as neither near
nor far can at the same time be perceived as slightly near and slightly
far) and the PNR structure (what is perceived as neither ordered nor
disordered can at the same time be perceived as slightly ordered and
slightly disordered).
4. Study 2
Study 1 demonstrated a) that intermediates are highly evident
(in any case more than pole properties) in some of the stimuli
presented, b) that in general their recognition and assessment in
terms of quantiﬁcation is not more time consuming than the recogni-
tion and assessment of polar properties, c) that there are regularities
in the presence versus exclusion to a certain degree of one (or both)
polar properties when intermediates are experienced, depending on
the type of dimension, and ﬁnally d) that responses turned out to
be more graded than expected: poles and intermediates which had
been expected to be point properties often turned out to have a
(more or less extended) gradable structure. Moreover, instead of
the absence of intermediates which had been expected for dimension
type PNR, gradable ratings of intermediates were found for 3 out of
the 4 pairs studied.
Study 2 was designed to test whether the latter two discrepancies
(described in point d) might be due to the task used. The same series
of images as those presented in study 1 were used in study 2 in a clas-
siﬁcation task. Participants were asked to decide, for each image, if it
showed property a, property b or an intermediate between them
(neither a nor b). If the structures of the poles and of the intermedi-
ates resulting from this study are consistent with BSK taxonomy,
this will prove that the difference between the two tasks is critical.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
64 undergraduate students aged 20 to 31 (divided into two groups).
4.1.2. Materials
The same series of images as those used in study 1.
4.1.3. Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a room at the university. The
instructions were projected onto a screen and were also verbally
explained by the person conducting the experiment. Participants
were asked to look at the images forming each series and, using a
form to record their responses, to indicate whether the property
shown was pole a, pole b or neither a nor b. Each image remained
on the screen for 10 s; after 3 s of blank screen (during which partic-
ipants responded) the subsequent image appeared. The images
forming each series were presented in the same random order as in
study 1.
Each series was introduced by means of a question (reported on
the response form) e.g. “Is the ﬂag at the top, at the bottom or neither
at the top nor at the bottom of the mountain?”. All questions were for-
mulated in the same way. It was explained that we were interested in
understanding which variations of a property from one extreme to
the opposite extreme are recognized as pole a, which as pole b and
which as neither a nor b. Participants were asked to rely on their
perception but to be as precise as possible. They were told to imagine
that their responses would be used to teach intelligent machines how
to distinguish spatial properties exactly as humans do.
3 Looking for possible explanations for this result, we thought that a ﬁrst likely crit-
ical aspect might be the homogeneity or non-homogeneity of the pattern, i.e. whether
the elements forming the textures are regularly distributed (as in a comb) or equidis-
tant (as in paper confetti). If they are not regular, empty spaces prevail in some parts of
the pattern while in other areas, where the elements are many and close, they appear
dense. This hypothesis would lead to expect neither dense nor sparse to be more ambig-
uous when applied to non-homogenous patterns (except the extremes) if one con-
siders that the pattern is dense in some parts, and sparse in others. Another critical
aspect (possibly independent of homogeneity) may be that in dense-sparse the quanti-
ty of the elements co-varies with the distribution of the elements in space. For extreme
values (when the elements are very few or when the elements are a lot) how the ele-
ments are distributed is likely a component that counts less in determining the appear-
ance of dense-sparse; in the quantiﬁcation of intermediates, how the elements are
distributed might be a critical variable. Of course these are hypotheses to test.
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4.2. Results
The key-question here is: what range of stimuli did each of the
three components elicit? To answer this question we calculated, for
each subject and each series of images, the range of stimuli classiﬁed,
respectively, as pole a, intermediates and pole b and then used Linear
Mixed Effect Models to study these data. As shown in Fig. 7 (where
thick unbroken lines represent the average range for each component
while thin unbroken lines represent the most frequent range —
i.e. the mode), clear differences emerged between types of dimen-
sions, whereas clear similarities emerged within each Type.
Linear Mixed Effect Models — with Type and Component as ﬁxed
effects and Dimension and Object as random effects (estimated
using ANOVA criterion) — revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of Com-
ponent (F(2, 3610) = 35.63, p b 0.001) and a signiﬁcant interaction
Type*component (F(6, 7577) = 67.56, p b 0.001). The interaction is par-
ticularly informative. We used Fisher's LSD-Test to focus on the com-
parisons which were the most interesting for our research questions,
i.e. to compare, within each typology, the average range of pole a, in-
termediates and pole b. The results of these comparisons are
summarized by the expression of equality-inequality reported at the
top of each quadrant in Fig. 7 (where ≠ indicates that the two com-
ponents have a signiﬁcantly different range for p b 0.05, and =that
they don't). Two typologies (i.e. RPR and PRP) turned out to have a
similar extension of the two poles and a signiﬁcantly different exten-
sion of the intermediates (smaller in RPR, bigger in PRP). In the other
Fig. 5. LOESS smooth of the rating data for each of the series of stimuli analyzed. Dimensions are grouped by structure type: RPR (top-left quadrant), PNR (top-right quadrant), RRR
(bottom-left), PRP (bottom-right).
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two typologies (RRR, PNR) the poles turned out to be asymmetric
with one more extended than the other. Moreover, in type RRR the
extension of the intermediate regions is either similar to that of one
pole or slightly less extended than both whereas in PNR the range
of intermediates is in between that of the two poles when considering
the average range but drops to zero stimuli (in agreement with BSK
taxonomy) when the most frequent range is considered.
In brief, the dimension structures in study 2 turned out to be in line
with BSK classiﬁcation. For type RPR (above–below and in front–behind)
the recognition of intermediacy occurred for only one central stimulus,
while all other stimuli were consistently referred to as displaying either
one pole or the other. Type PNR (complete–incomplete and ordered–
disordered) were described as consisting almost entirely of variations
of one pole, since a single image was associated with the opposite
pole; with regard to intermediates, the most frequent response (thin
line) is in agreement with SBK classiﬁcation, i.e. absence of intermedi-
ates, while the average range (thick line) suggests something different.
For type PRP (at the top–at the bottom and beginning–end) the two
extreme properties showed, respectively, one property and its opposite,
while all other stimuli were perceived as variations of intermediates.
With type RRR (near–far and dense–sparse), all three components
applied to a range of stimuli as in BSK but in our study the “smaller”
pole, i.e. sparse and near, was more extended than the opposite pole,
dense and far, while in BSK it was the other way round. This inversion
might be due to the kind of stimuli presented: images were limited by
the size of the computer screen— they could not therefore be quantita-
tively as extensive as they would be in ecological settings such as those
used for the BSK taxonomy.
5. Study 3
Studies 1 and 2 left us with a thought-provoking question
concerning the difference between the two studies in terms of
gradability: properties deﬁned as point properties in study 2 were
graded in study 1, and intermediates described as non-existent in
study 2 were described as present and graded in study 1. Before com-
ing to a conclusion regarding this difference, we decided to carry out a
further rating task, as in study 1, but using a simpliﬁed version. Given
that our main interest here concerned the structure of intermediates,
we limited quantiﬁcation to the intermediate component, asking par-
ticipants to look at the images forming each series and to respond to
the question: “to what extent is the property [neither a nor b] visible”?
If the property was evident to some extent, participants were then
requested to quantify this. If their answer was zero, one of the two
poles was therefore visible, and they were requested to indicate
which. Since participants were not being asked to rate the same im-
ages for the three components (as in study 1), the possibility that
polar ratings might interfere with the intermediate ratings can be
Fig. 6. Graphs showing the most frequent category rating (mode) for the 23 stimuli forming each series. The 4 graphs refer to pairs belonging (from top-left to bottom-right) to the
RPR, PRP, RRR and PNR structures respectively.
Table 2
Results of the 2sample Permutation Tests (T) applied to the LOESS regression curves of the two objects— and referring to pole a, intermediates and pole b, respectively — for each of
the dimensions analyzed (resampling process = 1000).
Dimension Pole a (obj1 vs 2) Neither-nor (obj1 vs 2) Pole b (obj1 vs 2)
Above–below T = 403, p = 0.9711 T = 506, p = 0.1805 T = 441, p = 0.8145
In front–behind T = 385, p = 0.9329 T = 436, p = 0.9167 T = 391, p = 0.4256
Complete–incomplete T = 519, p = 0.7669 T = 594, p = 0.7597 T = 556, p = 0.3187
Ordered–disordered T = 446, p = 0.3152 T = 603, p = 0.1259 T = 570, p = 0.6684
Far–near T = 559, p = 0.9826 T = 519, p = 0.4052 T = 459, p = 0.798
Dense–sparse T = 518, p = 0.2909 T = 577, p = 0.841 T = 432, p = 0.6424
Top–bottom T = 472, p = 0.7866 T = 565, p = 0.5631 T = 360, p = 0.5062
Beginning–end T = 330, p = 0.9544 T = 624, p = 0.8788 T = 401, p = 0.6649
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excluded. If, despite this, the results from study 3 conﬁrm what was
found in study 1, this will reinforce the conclusion that quantiﬁcation
and classiﬁcation lead to different structures (with interesting
theoretical and methodological implications).
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
88 undergraduate students (aged 19 to 31), divided into two
groups, 47 in group 1, 41 in group 2.
5.1.2. Materials
The same pairs of opposites and series of images as those used in
studies 1 and 2. The series (and the 23 images within each series)
were presented in the same random order as in the previous studies.
5.1.3. Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a room at the University. The
two groups participated in the study separately at the beginning of
a class which was unrelated to the topic of the research. Participants
were asked to look at the images forming each series (each image
was projected on a screen for 10 s) and to rate to what extent the
property neither a nor b was visible (e.g. “to what extent is the prop-
erty neither at the top nor at the bottom visible?”). A 0–10 rating scale
was used.
A response sheet with 8 tables (one for each series) was provided.
There was a list of numbers corresponding to the 23 images and 3
columns. The central column was for ratings of intermediacy and if
the rating was 0, participants were asked to mark a cross in the
column to the left or to the right of the central column corresponding
respectively to pole a or pole b.
The questions, which changed at the beginning of each series,
were projected and also read aloud by the experimenter before the
presentation of the images. Participants were asked to focus on
what they perceived.
5.2. Results
Fig. 8 shows a comparison between the ratings of intermediates in
studies 1 and 3 (data from Study 1 had previously been recoded on a
scale 0–10, in order to use the same scale as study 3). As in study 1,
LOESS regression lines were drawn on the ratings.
The trend of responses turned out to be very similar in the two
studies, as Fig. 8 shows and as the results of the 2-sample Permuta-
tion tests used to study the difference between the points forming
the LOESS curves in studies 1 and 3 conﬁrmed (see Table 3). It should
be remembered that the 23 stimuli forming each series were
presented in random order so both the consistency of the responses
within each series (smoothness of the curves) and the similarity be-
tween the two studies are indices of the robustness of the responses.
In general, data from study 3 conﬁrmed that in a rating task prop-
erties (intermediates in this case) which in a classiﬁcation task would
be described as ungradable are described as being gradable. In the
same way, properties (intermediates) that in a classiﬁcation task
would be described as non-existent may be described to be present
to a certain degree. The two different distributions of responses pre-
viously found for the intermediate component in RPR type structures
(above–below and in front–behind) were conﬁrmed as was the almost
random distribution of responses for neither dense nor sparse.
6. Final discussion
In this article we looked for experimental evidence supporting the
hypothesis that intermediates deserve to be considered as perceptual
components of the structure of a dimension as much as the poles are.
This hypothesis is based, in general, on the idea that that opposites
are cognitive structures grounded in how properties appear in
terms of qualitative invariance or signiﬁcant variations (Bianchi &
Savardi, 2008a, 2008b, 2012; Savardi & Bianchi, 2009; Savardi,
Bianchi, & Bertamini, 2010). It develops a tenet — that of the founda-
tion of cognition in perception and action — already discussed in
previous literature with regard to other cognitive structures and func-
tions (for a review see Pecher & Zwaan, 2005).
Aristotle (Methaphysics, 1057a18-1057b04; Physics, 227a07–10;
229b15-20) already had an intuition that the species of opposition
which was most useful to refer to the empirical world was contrariety
since, according to his deﬁnitions, contrariety admitted intermediates
whereas other species of opposition did not. This article in a sense
conﬁrms his intuition.
We investigated by means of experimentation the direct experi-
ence of properties speciﬁcally recognized by observers as neither
variations of a pole nor variations of the opposite pole by focusing on
spatial experiences. Three main results emerged from these experi-
ments. Firstly, the response times in study 1 suggest that, for adults,
intermediates are no more difﬁcult to recognize and rate than polar
properties when pictures showing various ecological scenes are ob-
served. This ﬁnding is relevant since it allows us to exclude the possi-
bility that the recognition of intermediates is not as direct as that of
the two opposites (i.e. it is not derived by means of a mental process
of double exclusion of pole a and of pole b as the linguistic structure
neither a — nor b might lead one to think).
Secondly, the ﬁndings proved that participants were generally in
agreement when rating the extent to which intermediates were visi-
ble. This consistency emerged within each series of images: despite
the fact that the 23 images forming each series were presented in ran-
dom order, the shape of the functions describing the average rating of
intermediacy was usually very smooth. Furthermore, there was a
similarity in the ratings given to the same series of images by two
different samples of participants (i.e. study 1 versus study 3).
A third, more controversial, result concerns the number of images
(within each series) showing greater evidence of neither pole a nor
pole b rather than pole a or pole b. It ranged from one single picture
to most of the 23 pictures forming each series, depending on the
type of the dimension (RPR, PRP, RRR, PNR). However, even though
the responses in study 2, where a classiﬁcation task was used, ﬁtted
in almost perfectly with the taxonomy suggested in previous litera-
ture based on a different type of task (Bianchi, Savardi, & Kubovy,
2011) and indeed ﬁtted perfectly when the most frequent response
(mode) was considered, two systematic differences emerged when
a rating task was used (i.e. in studies 1 and 3). The ﬁrst systematic dif-
ference consisted of a generalization of the structure of a range to
properties classiﬁed as points; this was not speciﬁc to intermediates
but was true also for the poles. The second systematic difference
concerned ratings other than zero applying to intermediates which
in classiﬁcation tasks had been described as non-existent (i.e. to di-
mensions type PNR).
6.1. Potential impact of the results
The difference between the two tasks is interesting for both theo-
retical and methodological reasons. It tells us that people who are
asked to give quantitative ratings tend to graduate what in other con-
ditions they would describe and deal with as a binary variable (i.e. ei-
ther present or absent). Our ﬁndings, in a sense, support Paradis's
(2008) idea — which challenges widespread assumptions in linguis-
tics and cognitive linguistics — that degree is not a grammatical phe-
nomenon which is a characteristic only of certain types of word
classes, but rather can be associated with most meanings. In her
view, this happens because expressions that at ﬁrst sight display
non gradable content (and therefore do not appear to lend them-
selves to grading) may have a background structure suggesting
gradability that comes in the foreground when linguistic degree
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modiﬁers are used. An interesting point to be discussed, in our view,
is whether only semantics is involved in this process or whether this
shift is grounded in perception. Paradis too admits that “what is
characteristic of the path of development of degree meanings is the
conceptualization of the message as increasingly strongly grounded in
the situation” (2008, p. 337). Informal interviews carried out with our
participants at the end of studies 1 and 3 proved that participants
who responded to the question “to what extent, looking at the cake/
car park, do you perceive the property neither complete nor incomplete?”
with a rating of 0, gave their reason for this saying that, except for the
pictures showing a whole cake and a full car park (i.e. complete), all
other conditions showed a cake/car park which was incomplete or
more or less incomplete. Conversely, those who described the car park
as neither complete nor incomplete acknowledged that they had shifted
from rating complete-incomplete to full–empty when referring to the
car park and to the amount of cake remaining (a lot–a little) when
Fig. 7. Range of stimuli covered by each of the three components: pole a, neither a nor b (n/n), pole b. Thick unbroken lines refer to average range (with the 95% conﬁdence interval
indicated by dashed lines) whereas thin unbroken lines refer to the most frequent range (mode). Note (ﬁg. 7). Ranges were deﬁned in terms of the difference between the minimum
and maximum stimulus showing the property, thus the number of stimuli falling in effect under each component is the value of the difference + 1 (i.e. the number indicated in the y
axes + 1). Thus, for example, when the property was assigned to only one stimulus (e.g. stimulus 1), y = (1 − 1 = 0), which does not mean that none of the ﬁgures forming the series
was classiﬁed in this way, but that one was.
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referring to the cake. And in fact, neither full nor empty and neither a lot
nor a little apply to many images of the series (full–empty has a PRP
structure; a lot–a little has a RRR structure). A similar shift occurred
for point properties concerning the poles. For example, participants
who rated at the top as visible to a certain degree when looking at a
ﬂag which was beyond the middle of a mountain but not yet at the
top of it (and often at a considerable distance from it) admitted that
they had shifted from the dimension at the top–at the bottom to the di-
mension high–low (which indeed has a RRR structure).
We suggest that the multidimensionality of phenomenal experiences
is the key aspect here. It has been already shown that, when applied to
ecological scenes, perceptual judgments of large–small, high–low, long–
short, wide–narrow are not unidimensional (Bianchi, Savardi, & Burro,
2011). The shifts emerging in studies 1 and 3 manifest an interlace
between dimensions which comes to the fore when properties are ‘expe-
rienced’ and not simply ‘deﬁned’ in terms of a concept or meaning: it is
not by chance that the shift away from complete–incomplete ends up in
full–empty when the event under observation has the visual structure of
a car park (where discrete elements populate a delimitated space and
every element has its own place) but not when the object has a continu-
ous visual structure (the cake). The consideration that this interlace
between dimensions is embedded in the perceptual structure of what is
being observed and thus is objective not subjective, might reinforce
some intuitions expressed in cognitive linguistic literature (e.g. Paradis,
2008; Traugott & Dasher, 2005).
The second potential impact of our results concerns the models
and taxonomies of antonymy and opposites produced in cognitive
semantics and inspired by the genuine desire to link linguistic
Fig. 8. Comparison between the ratings of neither-nor given to the 23 images forming each series in studies 1 and 3, for each dimension and each object. LOESS regression curves are plotted.
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structures to their most likely cognitive counterparts (e.g. Cruse &
Togia, 1995; Paradis & Willners, 2011). Our results demonstrate the
need to think carefully about the region which lays in between
poles which cannot be modeled simply as weaker gradations of one
or the other pole: some dimensions have a range of instances (others
only one point experience) that are a third component — neither pole
a, nor pole b — situated between the two poles.
Finally, it seems to us that the presence or absence of an intermediate
region and its extension might also have implications for studies from
the perspective of an experiential view of language comprehension
which aims to predict the representation activated by a negative sen-
tence (Kaup, Lüdtke, & Zwaan, 2006; Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, Zwaan, &
Lüdtke, 2007; Kaup, Zwaan, & Lüdtke, 2007). There has been growing
evidence in literature that understanding a text activates the construc-
tion of mental simulations which are considered to be experiential
in nature (Pecher & Zwaan, 2005; Pulvermüller, 2002; Richardson,
Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003). In this framework, it has been sug-
gested that comprehending a negative sentence (e.g. “the umbrella is
not open”) implies a two-step process of representation (Hasson &
Glucksberg, 2006; Kaup et al., 2006; Mayo, Schul, & Burnstein, 2004).
Kaup et al. (2006, 2007) found that 250 ms after reading a text
containing a negation, a facilitation effect occurred when participants
were shown a picture of this negated state of affairs (in the example a
closed umbrella), but if the picture was shown after 1500 ms, there
were shorter response times for the picture representing the positive
actual state of affairs (an open umbrella). The authors regard these
results to be not only proof that processing negated sentence predicates
involves a two-phase process (corresponding to the activation of two
opposite representations, the negated state of affairs followed by the
positive state of affairs), but also as proof that 1500 ms after reading a
sentence such as “the door was not open”, people mentally recreate a
closed door. Now, open–close are contraries without intermediates
(they belong to the PNR structure). What if the negated sentence relates
to dimensions with a wide range of intermediates, such as at the top–at
the bottom? Given the sentence “the ﬂag is not at the top of the moun-
tain”, are we sure that the facilitation effect, after 1500 ms, would
occur with an image of a ﬂag at the bottom of the mountain or with an
image of a ﬂag in an intermediate position? Would the same happen
with dimensions characterized by a single intermediate, such as in
front-behind? The phenomenological structure of opposites plays a role
in the referential understanding of negation (Bianchi, Savardi, Burro, &
Torquati, 2011; Fraenkel & Schul, 2008; Paradis & Willners, 2006). It
might be worth investigating whether it affects various other forms of
representation processing as well.
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